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Professor Lawrence C Scharmann, from the University of Nebraska,
discusses the power of theory in scientific enquiry and how, through
understanding the drivers behind and applications of theory, science
and theology do not have to be at odds

Theories – a powerful tool
for science

S

cience – as a way of knowing and making sense
of the world – uses many conceptual ‘tools.’
Among these are observations, inferences,
predictions, hypotheses, laws, and theories. Together,
this array of conceptual tools represents a powerful
heuristic used to solve scientific puzzles and problems.
New discoveries often begin with observations
obtained through our senses (sight, smell, sound,
taste, and touch) and by means of measurement
instruments (e.g., telescopes, microscopes, mass
balances, thermometers, computers) that extend our
senses. Observations are repeated (and independently
corroborated), patterns are inferred and are then
aggregated to form a more generalised conclusion –
or theory. Theories permit scientists to make new
predictions (i.e., if -> then conditional propositions),
pose and test hypotheses, and collect confirming or
disconfirming additional data.
Theories, then, are simultaneously an endpoint of
inductive science and the starting point of deductive
science. Together, induction and deduction frame a
self-correcting cycle of verification – in other words,
science – through its working theoretical paradigms
– which is necessarily uncertain (especially at the
outset of new discoveries), subject to change with
the accumulation of new evidence, and increasing in
probabilistic accuracy over time. Theories that
continue to be useful tools are those that yield
confirmatory evidence repeatedly; theories that begin
to produce disconfirming results (i.e., anomalies)
eventually get replaced by a new theory that explains
both everything the previous theory did plus account
for the anomalies encountered.
Scientific theories, nonetheless, are often
mischaracterised by non-scientists, journalists, etc.,
as being merely someone’s guesses; guesses that
would be more appropriately labelled as conjecture
or speculation. Others mistakenly equate theory and
hypothesis. Still others incorrectly assert that
scientific laws (which refer to a limited set of
remarkably repeatable observational data) are
‘stronger’ than theories. In the practice of science,
however, laws are narrowly confined and limited in

Cycle of Verification

application, whereas theories are broad in scope and
widely applied. Simply stated, theories are scientists’
most powerful tools. For example, the HardyWeinberg law is remarkably useful in accurately
predicting
the
change
in
frequency
of
dominant/recessive alleles within a population over
time. The data sets for which the Hardy-Weinberg
law exhibits explanatory power are merely a small
fraction of the aggregate corroborative lines of
evidence in genetics, which in turn is but one support
discipline for evolutionary theory.

Do you believe in evolution?

One overriding question I often get from nonscientists (and students) is “Do you believe in
evolution?” I have learned over the extent of my
academic career to be very careful in responding to
this question. My standard response became, “Do
you believe in screwdrivers?” I ask them if my
question sounds odd – they affirm that it does – until
I clarify that a screwdriver is a tool that one learns to
use to assist in performing very specific tasks. A
screwdriver is to a builder what a theory is to a
scientist – a very good tool (when one uses it to
resolve a specific need). I elaborate that I accept the
evidence for evolution and the power it provides to
solve puzzles and answer scientific questions. In
other words, I don’t care whether anybody believes
in evolution, I only care whether evolutionary theory
works – does it provide explanatory power, predictive
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Way of knowing

Purpose

Science

Establish criteria for determining ‘proximate causes’; look for patterns in available
evidence; pose models to solve puzzles and problems through cycles of
testing/observation/measurement; inference; reexamination of assumptions based
on new evidence

Theology

Determine appropriate guidelines for human behavior and interaction;
recognise/determine potential ‘ultimate’ causes

Aesthetics

Explore individual and group affective/emotional reactions to auditory, visual
stimuli, etc.

Table 1: Different ways of knowing (or tools for making decisions)

capacity, and does it permit broad testing of new ‘ifthen’ conditional propositions.

Ways of knowing
“… science must insist that, whatever the factual
state of nature, our yearnings and quest for morality
and meaning belong to the different domains of the
humanities, the arts, philosophy, and theology – and
cannot be adjudicated by the findings of science.”1
This quote implies that science – as a way of knowing
– is a powerful ally when it is used to solve scientific
questions. However, despite this power in a scientific
context, science does not answer non-scientific
questions. Let’s compare science with theology and
aesthetics as ways of knowing (See Table 1).
Does one way of knowing preclude the need for the
other two? Let’s consider music as a case. Science
could undertake a study to establish which type of
music (e.g., classical, country, gospel, pop, rap, rock)
is scientifically superior. Criteria could be established,
agreed to, applied, data collected, and an answer
determined. But, in doing so, science does not
account for appropriate ethical behaviour, inspiration,
or even more simply, which type of music somebody
likes. Thus, accepting a new way of knowing
(science, specifically theories like evolution) doesn’t
negate the need for other tools (or ways of knowing)
in one’s toolbox. How many tools one wants to
accept/use becomes a personal choice.

The debate that never happened
Some years ago now, I presented this logic to an
evangelical minister who had requested to meet with
me, and a biology colleague for the purpose of
discussing the potential for having a debate
concerning how did humans get here on Earth. The
minister carefully considered my logic and finally
asked, “So … you aren’t saying that science has the
answer for everything … are you?” [I nodded that he
was correct]. “Well then, there is really no need for a
debate because one can accept answers from
science without creating a conflict with religion.”
[Again, I nodded]. “And … just because an
explanation might be more scientific, doesn’t always
mean it is better, just that it is more scientific.” The
minister came to the conclusion that creating a false
dichotomy wasn’t productive … and I could not have
agreed more! The debate never happened!
In future articles, I will examine how evolutionary
theory can be used as an applied problem-solving
tool, what insights evolutionary theory provides in
coping with a pandemic, and how biology teachers
might establish more positive learning environments
for evolution instruction.

References
1 Gould, S.J. (2003). The Hedgehog, the Fox, and the Magister’s Pox
(p. 106). New York: Harmony Books

Lawrence C Scharmann
Professor of Education
Department of Teaching, Learning, and
Teacher Education
University of Nebraska
+1 402 472 2231
Lscharmann2@unl.edu
https://cehs.unl.edu/tlte/
www.innovationnewsnetwork.com | The Innovation Platform ISSUE 3 | 165

